In this comment we argue that the experimental evidence provided by Cummings et al. is not inconsistent with hypothetical referenda being an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting economic values. Differences in response proportions between hypothetical and real referenda can be expected if the underlying distributions have equal means but differ in scale. Once rescaled, Cummings et al.'s experiments provide evidence that responses to hypothetical referenda in experimental markets are not incapable of accurately estimating willingness to pay relative to responses to real referenda in experimental markets. By relaxing the assumptions of equal covariate effects and homoskedastic responses, we show that the Cummings et al. experiments are indistinguishable from an experiment with random draws from a binomial distribution with equal probabilities of success and failure. (1997) offer experimental evidence rejecting the hypothesis that a hypothetical referendum is an incentive compatible mechanism for obtaining the social value, or willingness to pay, for changes in the allocation of environmental goods and services. While cautious in offering a blanket rejection of hypothetical referenda as a means of measuring economic values based on their findings, the authors do suggest that at least in experimental settings respondents appear to behave differently when real money is changing hands. Whether hypothetical situations adequately mimic real market situations has been debated in the contingent valuation literature since its inception (see Cummings, Brookshire, and Schultze, 1986). Cummings et al.'s findings of incentive incompatibility appears to offer strong evidence for the critics of hypothetical referenda.
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In a recent Journal of Political Economy article, Cummings, Elliot, Harrison and Murphy (1997) offer experimental evidence rejecting the hypothesis that a hypothetical referendum is an incentive compatible mechanism for obtaining the social value, or willingness to pay, for changes in the allocation of environmental goods and services. While cautious in offering a blanket rejection of hypothetical referenda as a means of measuring economic values based on their findings, the authors do suggest that at least in experimental settings respondents appear to behave differently when real money is changing hands. Whether hypothetical situations adequately mimic real market situations has been debated in the contingent valuation literature since its inception (see Cummings, Brookshire, and Schultze, 1986) . Cummings et al.'s findings of incentive incompatibility appears to offer strong evidence for the critics of hypothetical referenda.
In this comment, we show that the results of the experiments presented by Cummings et al. do not reject the hypothesis of incentive compatibility of hypothetical referenda. Using two alternative models, one that maintains the assumption of equal covariate effects but relaxes the assumption of homoskedasticity across experimental treatments, and one that relaxes both the assumption of equal covariate effects and homoskedasticity, we show that Cummings et al. experiments fail to reject the hypothesis that "a voter's behavior is independent of the use of a real or hypothetical referendum mechanism" (Cummings et al., p 611) . We further show that their experimental results provide little information as to how respondents answer the hypothetical or real referenda, and the responses to their experimental referenda can not be statistically distinguished from a coin flip.
The Model
In Cummings et al.'s experiments, incentive compatibility of real and hypothetical responses is tested by comparing individuals' responses to whether they would donate $t for the provision of a public good, where $t=10 for all respondents. Respondents are told that if at least one-half of the group, who were all present in the same room, voted in favor of contributing to the good, then everyone in the group must contribute $t. If less than one-half of the group voted for the donation, no one would have to contribute $t. The groups of respondents are randomly assigned to either a real or hypothetical treatment condition. If they are assigned to a real experiment group, they are told that the money will be collected immediately following the vote.
If they are assigned to the hypothetical treatment, they are told that the proposition is hypothetical but to respond as if it were a real vote and real money were to change hands 1 .
Underlying the responses in the real market experiment is an individual specific willingness to pay function (WTP R ) that determines the response (Cameron and James (1987) ). If WTP R <t then a no response will be reported, and if WTP t R ≥ then the respondent will vote in favor of the proposition. Assuming WTP R is a linear function of a row vector of covariates X i R , with the first element being 1, a column vector of parameters β , and a normally distributed (mean zero,
to capture the individual variation unknown to the investigators, the probability of a no response to the real referendum is:
(1) ( ) ( )
Making similar assumptions and denoting hypothetical respondents with a superscript H, the probability of a no response to the hypothetical referendum is:
Equations (1) and (2) are the simple probit formulations of response probabilities to the real and hypothetical referenda implicitly used by Cummings et al.
The variability of responses in the real experiments is likely to be less than in the hypothetical experiments because the real experiments control for more sources of variability in choice; hence, F R is believed to be smaller than F H (Louviere, 1996) . As Harrison (1989) , and Smith and Walker (1993a,b) point out, the lower the opportunity cost to respondents of deviating from the rational decision the more variable will be the responses. Smith and Walker (1993b) provide experimental evidence that increasing the opportunity cost of deviating from the rational response has no significant impact on the slope of the bid functions of respondents, but the variability of responses is significantly reduced by increasing the opportunity cost. The real experiment of Cummings et al. involves a higher opportunity cost of deviation from the rational response, and thus should exhibit a lower variance than the lower opportunity cost hypothetical referendum.
Since t is not varied across individuals in the Cummings et al. experiments as is typically done in hypothetical referenda (Cameron and James, 1987) , it is absorbed into the constants ( ) β β 0 R , and 0 H and the two probit models can be written: ( ) In their pooled probit model, the null hypothesis in (3) is rejected. Based on the rejection, they conclude that hypothetical referenda are not incentive compatible.
From (3), we can see that unequal $'s, unequal scale parameters, or both can lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Failure to account for heteroskedasticity when pooling real and hypothetical data results in insufficient estimators and unreliable hypothesis tests. In Cummings et al.'s case, it leads them to mistake heteroskedasticity for incentive incompatibility.
Remedies and New Estimation Results
Differences in scale can lead to rejection of incentive compatibility when in fact, individuals have a single mean willingness to pay across treatments. One possibility for testing the consistency of real and hypothetical data is to test the hypothesis: Table 1 . We find that the effect of the shift dummy variable (Real) that distinguishes the real from hypothetical treatments is not significantly different from zero.
When properly scaled, the real and hypothetical data are consistent with each other. Further, none of the coefficients on the variables used in an attempt to explain the yes/no answers for the real and the scaled hypothetical treatments are statistically significant. This suggests that the real and hypothetical responses are both noisy signals of willingness to pay for the public good in these experiments.
Graphical Interpretation of the Results

Cummings et al. provide further evidence for their finding of inconsistent responses based
on hypothetical referenda by observing the relative proportion of yes responses from the real and 6 hypothetical treatments. They argue that differences in response proportions between the hypothetical and real treatments is evidence of incentive incompatibility. Again, the results can be driven by the different degrees of variability between real and hypothesis responses and not by incentive incompatibility. Figure 1 illustrates two distributions of willingness to pay. Consistent with our findings, the distribution for those offered the hypothetical referendum is flatter with fatter tails than the real referendum distribution. A bid offer that is above the mean willingness to pay for both referenda will result in a higher percentage of yes responses for the hypothetical referendum than will the real referendum. This suggests that a simple comparison of response proportions is not a valid test of incentive compatibility of real and hypothetical referenda when the relevant distributions differ by scales.
Further Relaxing the Assumptions
The original Cummings et al. probit model (Table 1 Column 1) and the rescaled model (Column 6) both maintain the assumption that all covariate effects are equal for all individuals across experimental treatments. The rescaling test performed above does not allow us to investigate whether respondents respond the same to the real and hypothetical treatments if all covariate effects, and the variance of responses are allowed to vary. To do so, we can observe the predicted probability of a no response from the split sample probits (Columns 3 and 4). The split sample probits represent estimation under the assumption that covariate effects and/or variances can vary across treatments.
To investigate whether the estimated probability of a no response differs across experimental treatments, 1,000 bootstrapped parameter vectors were obtained for the split real and hypothetical samples 5 . For each of the 275 individuals in the combined sample the predicted probability of a no response is calculated for each of the bootstrap repetitions for both the real and hypothetical treatment. By calculating the predicted probability for all of the 275 individuals in the combined sample, we now have the predicted distribution of a no response for a representative sample of the population (assuming the original sample is random). These bootstrapped distributions of the probability of a no response are used to calculate 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probability of a no response for each individual for both the real and hypothetical treatments. For all 275 individuals, the probabilities of a no response to the real and the hypothetical referenda are statistically indistinguishable. The 95% confidence 7 intervals around the probability of a no response overlap for all 275 individuals. In addition, 88%
of the real respondents and 100% of the hypothetical respondents have 95% confidence intervals that include a probability of no response equal to .50. In other words, the experiments reported by Cummings et al. provides both real and hypothetical responses that for an overwhelming number of respondents are statistically indistinguishable from a coin flip.
Conclusions
In this comment we argue that the experimental evidence provided by Smith (1997) points out an inherent problem with the public good used in the experiment. The number of booklets to be distributed to the residents of New Mexico is a function of the number of experimental subjects in the room at the time (The referendum proposal states that 2N booklets will be distributed, where N is the number of subjects participating in that particular round of the experiment). Since the experiment was performed across a number of groups, the size (or scope) of the public good differs according to the size of the group. Smith finds no significant differences in the percentage of yes responses as the scope of the good differs. 2 Swait and Louviere show that under H A , this grid search procedure provides a consistent estimate of the relative scale parameter. An efficient estimate can be obtained by taking one Newton-Raphson step from the consistent estimate. 3 In addition we ran the rescaling procedure with just a constant (no covariates) and came to the same conclusions. These results are available upon request. 4 It should be noted here that we must now maintain the hypothesis that all parameter estimates are jointly identical in order to test for heteroskedasticity. This procedure can not be used to test the hypothesis that individual parameter estimates differ across treatments, and therefore does not test whether differences in individual parameters may be driving the results. 5 The bootstrap procedure supplied in the Gauss386i contrained maximum likelihood routine generates a random sample with replacement from the original data set by drawing pseudorandom Poisson weights. The bootstrap estimation is carried out using weighted maximum likelihood estimation.
